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China's own desire. It is proper to produce a draft as a basis for negotiations, but it is certainly unreasonable, and in dealing with China undiplomatic, to insist on carrying out the draft to the letter. No country, however powerful, could expect this, yet, as far as I can see, this is the stand taken by my friends at home. The draft was made out during my stay in Sweden in the summer of last year by our former Consul- General in Shanghae, Hagberg, an experienced man who has had ten years in the East. We inserted many other stipulations taken from existing Treaties with the object of giving ourselves latitude to make concessions.
A month after I left Stockholm the Foreign Office people obtained the Royal consent to this draft, and now, when the final Treaty has been worded, after full negotiations and mutual concessions, they find themselves unable to accept it, though to my mind, while different in form from approved draft, there is no difference in the provisions of the Treaty.
As you will see from the inclosed documents, there are differences in the form, for the Chinese refused absolutely to cousent right away to what was put before them. I pointed this out in a Memorandum sent home with the Treaty, but as to the actual The most- provisions I am not able to see any difference worth consideration. favoured clause covers what is left out. The stipulations regarding trade-marks, patent rights, mining, and the trade with morphia come in under this clause, and it is very much in question if it is not better to have this and other rights covered by most- favoured-nation clause than to have these embodied in a Treaty, when, in case of changed conditions brought about by later Treaties, they may cause all sorts of difficulties.
My opinion is therefore, in short, that the concluded Treaty practically covers the draft, and further I have the absolute conviction that nothing more can be obtained from the Chinese. Later on probably less. This is, however, to he proved to the people at home, and it is here the difficulty for me comes in. Authoritative objections require authoritative rejoinders. Pleading is not decisive unless backed up by evidence, and here is where I ask your help, as a friend, with some backing and some evidence. Kindly look over the inclosed documents, viz., draft of Treaty made in Stockholm, Treaty concluded and signed by me, and Memorandum appended to same.
It would be a great personal favour if you could help me with evidence which would of course not be published, but presented in a confidential way to our Foreign Minister, and if, after giving an exposé of Treaty matters in the East, better known to you than to any one else, you could state your opinion that under present circumstances nothing more can be obtained from the Chinese, and that likewise the concluded Treaty practically covers the draft, I cannot say how thankful I would be if you would help me in this matter. The rigid attitude and bureaucratism of Stockholm will never succeed in negotiations with the Chinese. It requires more practiced conceptions, affability, and experience to come to an understanding with them, and I really believe that with the assistance of your opinion I will be able to get my view accepted. Once more, hoping that you will be able to assist me, I beg, &c.
(Signed)
Inclosure 2 in No. 1.
WALLENBERG.
M. Wallenberg to Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.
Your Excellency,
Peking, July 2, 1908. DULY authorized by a Royal Decree to conclude a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with China, I bave the honour to report that the negotiations for the Treaty were opened at the latter end of April and are now concluded. The Treaty was yesterday signed by the Chinese Plenipotentiary and myself.
It has been a question of whether the Treaty of 1847 is still in force. Article 34 of this Treaty provided that it was concluded for twelve years only, and when opening negotiations I consequently took the position that the present matter was a revision of the Treaty of 1847, still in force. I did not talk as if we were concluding a new Treaty.
During the preliminary negotiations it was recorded that the Treaty of 1847 was still in force on account of usage. This instrument, entirely antiquated, as well in form as in contents, was of no use as a guide in our work; but a draft compiled by ex-Consul-
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General Hagberg last summer and revised by Count Ehrensward, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was of great assistance. This draft was principally based on the Japanese Treaty of 1896.
The time chosen was unfavourable for Treaty negotiations. Germany and Italy had just been compelled to discontinue similar negotiations. Our situation did, however, not compare with theirs. The position of these countries was different in that they claimed absolutely new rights never granted before by the Chinese to any country, while we had no other interest to obtain than to get our Treaty put into shape and to secure recognition of the right of treatment as a most favoured nation.
I am told by the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps that China has made known her intention of entering into negotiation with all the Treaty Powers for the renovation of their Treaties. This desire is the result of the force of circumstances.
China is over- conscious of her national awakening, improving civilization, growing trade, general development, and, last but not least, the mutual envy of the Powers She feels that the time has come for her to stand on her own legs, and stop the sapping of her rich resources by foreigners. All the earlier Treaties with the foreigners have been very one-sided, the latter obtaining benefits without granting compensation in like nature to China. Clause by clause was conceded by China, while the other side promised nothing. Not even the most-favoured-nation clause was mutual; but in the Japanese Treaty of 1903 there was added to the first clause a stipulation granting to Japan all the privileges which China may concede to any other Power, while on her side Japan stipulated “she would do her best" in order to grant to China most-favoured-nation treatment.
It is clear that the time for the one-sided form of Treaty is past, but no Power was willing to make a new start, each anticipating that the start would be difficult. Consequently, Sweden is the first to make this stride forward. She grants as fully as possible the benefit of reciprocity, and there is no reason for acting otherwise, because with us uobody would deny the Chinese subject the same rights as all other nations' subjects enjoy, within the limits, of course, of our laws.
Both during the negotiations and afterwards I was conscious of my inexperience, and was constantly in communication with those of my confrères who are known to be experienced in Chinese affairs. In this connection I must express my gratitude for the assistance given me by Mr. Rockhill, the American Minister; Sir John Jordan, the British Minister; Jonkheer van Citters, the doyen; Mr. Abé, Councillor of the Japanese Legation; Mr. Campbell, Chinese Secretary for twenty years of the British Legation; and Sir Robert Bredon, Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs, who has spont the best part of his life in China.
The time wasted over negotiations was at first a source of annoyance to me, but those gentlemen counselled great patience in dealing with the Chinese. They also informed me that the time for Treaty-making was very inopportune, because the Chinese were never so self-important as now, and it was even a question whether satisfactory results would be obtained.
In consideration of these facts, and the necessity of unity being maintained among the foreigners, I was careful to avoid any possibility of prejudicing matters for which I afterwards could be blamed
4
(Contains a short description of etiquette observed.)
Mr. Woo, the translator, took a fortnight over his work, and at the next meeting I handed over the Chinese text.
said,
Another fortnight elapsed before a meeting took place, when his Excellency Lien-fang "Now we will come with a counter-proposal."
Another week elapsed, when a meeting took place at which the Chinese written counter-proposal together with a Memorandum were delivered. This Memorandum was immediately translated by the interpreter and caused our first clash, As a motive for jewer clauses in the counter-proposals, one expression of opinion was to the effect that small countries should be satisfied with small Treaties. It had also been noticed that most of the draft was taken from the Japanese Treaty of 1896, the result of an unfortunate war for China, and which, ie, the stipulations of that Treaty, it was not pleasant for the Chinese to repeat. It was also pointed out that while statisties proved Sweden had a growing export trade to China, and that her merchants resided in the various ports, China had no trade with Sweden, and that, as far as was known, no Chinamen were living there, &c.
Surprised by these strange points, I asked that the Memorandum be translated, as it contained an explanation of the way the new Articles proposed by the Chinese had been compiled from our draft. This was done, after which there was an hour's discussion
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